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A recent paper [1] suggests that Deep Neural Networks can be protected from
gradient-based adversarial perturbations by driving the network activations into a
highly saturated regime. Here we analyse such saturated networks and show that
the attacks fail due to numerical limitations in the gradient computations. A simple
stabilisation of the gradient estimates enables successful and efficient attacks. Thus, it
has yet to be shown that the robustness observed in [1] is not simply due to numerical
limitations.
Evaluating the robustness of neural networks is difficult. One core reason is the ambiguity
between network robustness and deficiencies of the adversarial attack: a network might just appear
robust because the core assumptions of the chosen attacker are not met. This is particularly obvious
for gradient-based adversarial attacks which inadvertently rely on stable gradient estimates. Even
in cases without gradients, however, many other adversarial attacks may still succeed, including
attacks that do not use gradient information like [2, 3] or gradient-based attacks using estimates
of the gradient.
A recent paper [1] suggests that highly saturated deep neural networks (DNNs) might be robust
against gradient-based adversarial perturbations. We here show that the observed robustness is
likely a side-effect of numerical limitations that arise in the high-saturation limit and which prevent
stable computations of the gradient. These limitations can be lifted by a simple and stable estimate
of the gradients.
In a first step we tried to reproduce the results of [1] by training a three-layer Multi-layer
Perceptron (MLP) together with the proposed saturation penalty. This penalty pushes the hidden-
layer activations of the network into the saturated parts of the non-linearity (zero and one for
sigmoid, zero for ReLU). We report the classification accuracy for both the vanilla and the saturated
network for normal and adversarial images in Table 1. In agreement with [1] the performance of
the MLP with and without penalty is almost identical, but the robustness to a simple adversarial
attack with the fast-gradient sign method (FGSM) drastically increases for the latter. We also
verified that the weight and activation distribution qualitatively match the results in [1], Figure
S1.
In highly saturated networks the gradients of the loss with respect to the input are either
exactly zero or numerically unstable. Using these unreliable values from the saturated network
directly without numerical stabilisation is likely to fail. In Figure 1 we plot the distribution of
elements of the gradients. In the saturated network more then 98,2% of the gradient elements are
Training Sigmoid MLP ReLU MLP
Plain naive FGSM stable FGSM Plain naive FGSM stable FGSM
Vanilla 98% 2,5% - 98,7% 0,2% -
Saturated 97,2% 96,6% 1,7% 98,1% 98,0% 8,4%
Table 1: Adversarial robustness of vanilla and saturated sigmoidal and ReLU MLPs. While the
naive application of FGSM fails to generate suitable adversarial examples, a slightly modified
FGSM based on a more stable gradient estimate is still highly successful.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
70
4.
01
54
7v
1 
 [s
tat
.M
L]
  5
 A
pr
 20
17
0.100 0.075 0.050 0.025 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075
100
101
102
103
104
Vanilla
4 2 0 2 4
1e 18
100
101
102
103
104
Saturated
Figure 1: Histogram over the elements of the gradients of the input image with respect to the
cross-entropy loss (the direction of the adversarial perturbation) for both the vanilla sigmoid MLP
(left) and the saturated sigmoid MLP (right). In the saturated network more then 98% of the
gradient elements are exactly zero while the rest is sixteen orders of magnitude smaller then in the
vanilla network.
exactly zero, compared to none in the vanilla network. At the same time, all non-zero elements
are sixteen orders of magnitude smaller the gradient elements of the vanilla network, suggesting
that the residual gradients of the saturated network are due to rounding errors or are susceptible
to numerical instabilities. For 97,9% of the images exactly all elements of the gradient are zero.
In this case FGSM applies absolutely no perturbation to the corresponding image and the attack
is inadvertently unsuccessful. For all other images the FGSM attack was successful in 62% of the
cases.
The overall success rate of FGSM is directly related to the number of zero-valued gradients.
In Figure 2 we plot the success of FGSM and the ratio of non-zero gradients as a function of the
gain. For gains below 10−3 FGSM is highly successful (as evaluated on the saturated sigmoid MLP
with gain 1). For larger gains, however, zero-valued gradients start to appear. Unsurprisingly, the
success rate of FGSM strongly decreases with the number of zero-valued gradients.
It is straight-forward to attack saturated networks through a simple trick that allows more stable
gradient estimates. To this end we note that in highly saturated networks a modest reduction in
the gain of the sigmoids barely change the activations (they will still be close to zero and one)
but can significantly increase the numerical stability of the gradient estimates. We then use this
gradient to generate an adversarial example according to the usual FGSM procedure and use it as
an input to the original saturated network. As can be seen in Table 1, this simple modification
of FGSM is highly successful in fooling the saturated network. For saturated ReLU MLPs we
observed a saturation of the softmax and devised a similar attack by down-scaling the activations
of the readout layer (Table 1).
Taken together, we demonstrated that the robustness observed in [1] likely originates from the
numerical instabilities of gradient computations in highly saturated networks. A simple stabilisa-
tion of the gradient computations still allow standard gradient-based adversarial attack methods
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Figure 2: The success of the FGSM attack clearly reflects the ratio of non-zero gradients. Networks
with different gain are only used to generate adversarial images using the FGSM method. The
accuracy by which the adversarials fool the saturated network (gain = 1) is plotted in red. The
success of FGSM is highly correlated with the ratio of non-zero gradients (black).
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to succeed. While we cannot say with certainty that the same attack succeeds for the networks
analysed in [1] (without access to the source code we cannot exclude unintended differences in
the implementation and the network parameters), it has yet to be shown that the robustness ob-
served in [1] does not originate from numerical limitations. More generally, our findings highlight
the critical importance of choosing the most suitable methods to challenge the robustness of the
network.
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Figure S1: (a) Sigmoid MLP Weight and activation distribution for both the vanilla (top) and
saturated (bottom) network. We observe a qualitatively similar increase in the kurtosis of the
weights and the bimodality of the activations as in [1]. (b) ReLU MLP Same as (a) but for
ReLU nonlinearities. Similar to [1] the activations are not bimodal as in the sigmoid MLP but
feature a high kurtosis.
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